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Chairman: Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland)
(Vice-Chairman)

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In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Patokallio (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 49 to 65, 68 and 142; and 67 and 69 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS

Mr. PAK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Allow me first to congratulate Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt on his election as Chairman of this important Committee. I am convinced that with his skilled diplomatic talent and wonderful experience the Committee's work will be brought to a fruitful conclusion.

My delegation takes this opportunity also to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their election.

Today in democratizing international relations and establishing a new international order it is most important to oppose power politics and make disarmament a reality. The cessation of the cold war and changes in the international situation have strengthened the will of the people of the world for disarmament while offering favourable circumstances for the solution of disarmament issues. Justification of the arms race and armament as deterrents to war is no longer a tenable argument.

Under these circumstances, multilateral, bilateral and regional negotiations and efforts in the field of disarmament have been made recently and some progress has been achieved in that area. The agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States last June on deep cuts in strategic arms is but one example.

However, although the cold war has ceased to be, the qualitative arms race is continuing and more sophisticated nuclear weapons are being produced.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The world is still under a nuclear threat. This shows that disarmament still remains the first task of the international community in solving international issues.

In recent years the interest of mankind has been focused on the issues of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the total elimination of all nuclear weapons around the globe in keeping with the present situation. The lack of results to date, compared with the efforts made by the international community towards nuclear disarmament, requires all statesmen to think and act more realistically.

In bringing about nuclear disarmament it is most important that the nuclear Powers should be conscious of their special responsibility on this issue and should have the political will to eliminate nuclear weapons completely.

Today there is no reason whatsoever to possess nuclear weapons. The assertion that nuclear weapons should remain as a deterrent to war is anachronistic and can only be interpreted as an intention to dominate the world by relying on power politics.

The primary goal of the international community is to abolish all nuclear weapons, ban all nuclear tests and stop the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons. It is no secret that the purpose of continuous nuclear tests is to modernize nuclear weapons. The nuclear Powers are making a mockery of mankind by producing more delicate new nuclear weapons while reducing old nuclear weapons. Whether or not the nuclear Powers ban nuclear tests could be regarded as the criterion by which to judge whether or not they have the real political will to bring about nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The Government of our Republic supports the General Assembly resolutions related to the overall and complete ban on nuclear tests and holds that the nuclear Powers should not ignore the efforts of the international community to stop such tests.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is an important means of dismantling nuclear weapons and has made some contribution to preventing their proliferation. But if it serves only to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear-weapon States, while allowing nuclear tests and development by nuclear Powers, it cannot contribute to realizing mankind's desire to eliminate all nuclear weapons on Earth. We hold that the inequality of this regime, which fails to prevent nuclear-weapons development by nuclear Powers and which is used to exert pressure on non-nuclear States, should no longer be allowed, and we consider that this is an important question related to the fate of the non-proliferation Treaty itself.

Another issue to be mentioned with regard to the fate of the Treaty is the unusual fact that a country that possesses the technology for developing nuclear weapons is acquiring more fissionable materials than it needs. The world is watching with deep concern the fact that Japan is storing more plutonium than it needs.

Nuclear disarmament, the complete dismantling of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and deep reductions in conventional weapons are inevitable. An encouraging result of international efforts to abolish weapons of mass destruction is the noticeable progress that has been made in negotiations on a treaty banning chemical weapons.

Despite claims that some progress on disarmament has been made in recent years in negotiations between the super-Powers, the fact that arms transfers

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

from developed countries to developing countries is increasing, in turn exacerbating the arms race, gives rise to serious international concern. The main ringleaders in the export of arms are trying to divert international attention by labelling small countries such as mine exporters of missiles, even though they themselves are exporting weapons worth billions of dollars. We do not export missiles, and we oppose the transfer of missiles or missile technology to other countries.

At the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly Members took a great interest in the question of arms transfers, and a resolution to establish a United Nations register system was adopted. We recognize that this system is necessary for disarmament and confidence-building, and we think that it should be continued as a realistic measure to prevent arms races of all kinds and to control arms transfers. We consider, however, that the system will contribute to increasing transparency in international arms transfers only when it includes all types of weapons of mass destruction - including nuclear weapons and related equipment on Earth.

The attention of the international community is still focused on the question of disarmament on the Korean peninsula, whose location is vital to the security of Asia and where huge armed forces confront each other along the military demarcation line. The question of disarmament and peace on the Korean peninsula is important not only to the peace and security of the Asian region, but also to the destiny of our nation.

In particular, the fervent wish of the Korean people for reunification, which grows with each passing day, makes it a primary task, which brooks no delay, to realize disarmament and ensure peace on the Korean peninsula.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Because of its ardent desire to open the way to peaceful reunification of the country, the Government of our Republic made comprehensive disarmament proposals which include the Declaration of north-south non-aggression, the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, deep cuts in armed forces of the north and south to a defensive level of less than 100,000 and, in parallel with this, withdrawal of United States armed forces from south Korea in stages. The Government has made patient efforts to this end.

The realization of disarmament on the Korean peninsula depends on how the leaders of Korea, north and south, are conscious of their important responsibility to the nation and how they try to shoulder this responsibility.

In this connection, the effectuation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Cooperation and Exchanges between the north and the south and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula shows our nation's will to create the conditions for reunification by realizing disarmament by the force of national independence. This is an inevitable result of the fervent desire for reunification of the entire Korean people, a desire that grows day by day, and a great victory achieved in the course of the common struggle of the north and the south to bring about the three principles of national reunification.

The Eighth North-South High-Level Talks held in Pyongyang last month resulted in annexed agreements on the joint committees in various fields, and therefore the joint committees were able to begin their work. One was the North-South Joint Military Committee, which began work following the adoption of an annexed agreement on the implementation and observance of the "North-South Non-Aggression" part of the north-south Agreement. The annexed

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

agreement on implementation and observance consists of six chapters, the first four being: Chapter 1, "Non-use of arms"; Chapter 2, "Peaceful settlement of disputes and prevention of accidental armed conflict"; Chapter 3, "Demarcation line and districts of non-aggression"; and Chapter 4, "Installation and operation of military hotline".

Since the North-South Joint Military Committee is in operation for the realization of non-aggression, the legal system and apparatus to ease and put an end to the military confrontation on the Korean peninsula have been established; therefore there can be no reason for an arms race between the north and the south. This is the starting-point for the realization of disarmament. We will make every effort to carry out the annexed agreement to implement and observe the Declaration on non-aggression.

It is important for implementation of the north-south Agreement that all countries concerned respect it and create circumstances favourable for its implementation in conformity with the efforts of the north and the south. Historically the Korean question has been linked to international relations. Therefore, the other countries concerned should pay due attention to the efforts of the north and the south to carry out the north-south Agreement. Since the north and south have affirmed that they will not invade each other, what is called "deterrence to southward invasion" - the United States excuse for stationing troops in South Korea - is no longer necessary, and the withdrawal of United States troops has become the requirement of our time. If the United States rejects this demand, it may be considered as an indication that it does not recognize the non-aggression Agreement, and consequently may destroy the atmosphere of confidence between the north and the south created by its adoption.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The discontinuation of large-scale military exercises on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity is an urgent element in the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the implementation of the north-south Agreement. Last August, the joint military exercise "Focus Lens 92" was staged on the Korean peninsula by the United States and south Korea.

At the "24th South Korea-United States Annual Security Meeting", which was held recently in Washington, the United States and the south Korean authorities "agreed in principle" to resume the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises next year. Such provocative military manoeuvres cannot but be considered as an intentional act aimed at hampering the process of peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula, and at blocking the process of north-south dialogue.

Judging from the fact that the "Team Spirit" military manoeuvres were suspended before the inspection of our area by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it is all the more unjustifiable for them to be resumed at a time when nuclear inspection is under way.

The United States should not follow the power policy of the cold-war era. In line with the changed new situation it should stop interfering in the Korean question and, further, should take practical steps that would be conducive to the implementation of the north-south Agreement, rather than disturbing it.

The realization of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which is under the actual threat of nuclear weapons, poses a prime task. In accordance with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Peninsula, the north and south established and put into operation the Joint Nuclear Control Committee to discuss practical issues for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and they are now discussing the annexed agreement and inspection regulations on implementation of the Joint Declaration. In order to implement the Joint Declaration, it is important to inspect the United States nuclear weapons and bases in south Korea.

It is regrettable, however, that owing to the opposition of the United States and the south Korean authorities to inspection of the United States nuclear weapons and bases in South Korea, the regulations regarding inspection have not yet been adopted.

We have declared time and again that we have no nuclear weapons, nor have we any intention of making them or any capability for doing so. The honesty of the peaceful nuclear policy of the Government of our Republic and the will for denuclearization have already been proved by our ratification of the safeguards agreement and three rounds of ad hoc IAEA inspections. The so-called suspicion of our nuclear development is fading away.

If the United States nuclear weapons and bases in south Korea are verified through inspections, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will be realized. The nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula and the nuclear suspicion that remain unresolved arise from the deployment of United States nuclear weapons in south Korea.

Quite recently it was revealed that an underground storage place for United States nuclear weapons was built in the mountain area of south

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Korea and that there exists a United States nuclear submarine base in Jinhae, south Korea, to which many United States nuclear submarines, loaded with nuclear weapons, have frequent access. This causes us to have much suspicion about the sincerity of their announcement of the non-existence of United States nuclear weapons in south Korea. Therefore, it is obvious that the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula requires an overall inspection of the United States nuclear weapons and bases in south Korea.

However, the United States and south Korean authorities are refusing to open to the public all United States nuclear weapons and bases in South Korea and to agree to their inspection, and are insisting on "mutual inspection of the same numbers" and "challenge inspection" and are busily advertising them.

As for the inspection of ordinary military bases, this has nothing to do with the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, it is an internal matter that should be dealt with in the North-South Joint Military Committee established under the north-south Agreement.

The new "scenario" of the United States and south Korean authorities makes us believe that their purpose is to avoid the overall inspections of the United States nuclear weapons and bases in south Korea, frustrate the improvement of north-south relations by placing artificial obstacles in the way of north-south dialogue, and continue to pursue the policy of confrontation that will lead the situation of the Korean peninsula into confrontation.

We are of the view that if the south Korean authorities are truly interested in bringing about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

they should take an independent stand free from outside forces, take a decisive step to open the United States nuclear bases in South Korea, and accept the inspections which are intended to verify them.

It is our expectation that the United States, which is responsible for originating the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, should no longer interfere in the Korean question. It should modify its policy towards Korea in keeping with the changed situation and should take measures to accept the inspection of its nuclear weapons and bases in south Korea instead of trying to make false charges under the pretext of the "principle of mutual inspection of the same numbers" and "challenge inspection".

At the same time, we believe that due attention should be paid to the fact that any attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Korean nation in pursuit of some political purpose and to impose unilateral pressure will only have a negative effect to the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

On the basis of the fundamental ideal of its foreign policy - independence, peace and friendship - the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is paying close attention to the realization of disarmament and the dismantling of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on our planet.

My delegation believes that the deliberations on the items brought up for discussion in this Committee will help to facilitate the disarmament process in conformity with the changed international situation.

Mr. AKŞIN (Turkey): The framework and substance of international relations have gone through profound changes in the past few years. The

(Mr. Aksin, Turkey)

cold war has come to an end. The international landscape characterized for so long by ideological confrontation and nuclear stalemate has been dramatically altered, making it possible to establish new and cooperative patterns of international behaviour. These changes have brought about new opportunities and challenges, which in effect determine the main body of our current agenda. These momentous developments have made it possible to settle a number of conflicts which derived directly from the policies of confrontation of the cold-war era. The prospects for disarmament and arms limitation as key instruments for greater security have improved considerably.

However, the international community also faces new challenges. Ethnic, religious and territorial disputes, as well as resurgent nationalism that had long been suppressed under the old bipolar structure have now come to the surface, creating new tensions, crises and armed conflicts. Two years after the Gulf crisis, the aggression against the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the republics of former Yugoslavia, as well as developments in the Trans-Caucasus, serve as stark reminders that the creation of a new world will not happen by itself. The responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, as well as for the creation of a better world based on legality, justice and cooperation, rests with the Members of our Organization. Let us also remind ourselves that while the process of change has its own momentum, the positive results that we seek will be attainable only if we succeed in managing this momentum.

(Mr. Akşin, Turkey)

Although Europe is still not immune to armed conflicts, as is painfully evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the positive trend in the process of arms control and security-building has become clearly discernible in the last few years. We must pursue this process with renewed vigour.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) constitutes a cornerstone of future European security. With its full array of measures for reductions in conventional armaments and its far-reaching verification regime, and complemented by the CFE 1A agreement on personnel strength of conventional armed forces in Europe, this Treaty, the 1990 and 1992 Vienna Documents on confidence- and security-building measures, and the Charter of Paris are documents that attest to the ending of the cold war and the beginning of a new era of security partnership for that continent.

Turkey welcomes the agreement reached at the Helsinki Summit in July 1992 to apply the CFE Treaty provisionally. Turkey has already ratified the Treaty and looks forward to the early completion of the ratification process.

Turkey welcomes the decision taken at the Helsinki Summit to establish a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) forum for security cooperation. New negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building to be undertaken within the overarching framework of that forum will play a crucial role in enhancing the security dimension of the new European order. Negotiations on new security- and confidence-building measures and a structured dialogue on wider security issues will be an integral part of this process. As in the past, Turkey will continue to play an active role in achieving early and concrete results represented in measures that seek lower levels of forces, increased transparency and multifaceted military cooperation.

(Mr. Aksin, Turkey)

In the area of nuclear weapons, we commend the leadership and vision demonstrated by President Bush and President Yeltsin when they reached an agreement at the Washington summit last June to bring the number of deployed warheads well below the levels of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty). The agreement also provided for the elimination of all United States and Russian land-based intercontinental ballistic missililes (ICBMs) with multiple warheads. The Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty, which enabled Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become parties to the Treaty, was another major achievement in the field of nuclear disarmament, which we welcome.

In the area of nuclear non-proliferation, there have been very positive developments over the last year. The accession of France and China to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a historic step in the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We welcome the accession of South Africa to the NPT and the undertaking of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in the near future. The adherence of the five permanent members of the Security Council, which are also the five declared nuclear-weapon States, will significantly enhance the stature and further strengthen the universality of the Treaty, at a time when this Committee is beginning preparations for the NPT Conference to be held in 1995.

We consider the NPT a key multilateral disarmament agreement. By reducing considerably the risk of nuclear war, the NPT has made a significant contribution to international security and arms-control efforts. As a party to the NPT, Turkey holds the view that strict adherence to Treaty provisions, by both nuclear and non-nuclear parties, is of vital importance. At the NPT

(Mr. Aksin, Turkey)

Conference in 1995, contracting parties must explore all avenues that would give the Treaty greater effectiveness, including the option of an indefinite extension. Such a decision should be coupled with steps to develop further the Treaty's verification regime and efforts to promote universal adherence.

The declining trend in the number of nuclear-weapon tests continued in 1991. The moratoriums on nuclear testing adopted by the Russian and French Governments for the year 1991 and the decision of the United States Government to impose a nine-month moratorium are all welcome developments which pave the way for a total ban on nuclear testing.

The chemical-weapons Convention, which we hope will receive overwhelming support in the General Assembly, is a historic milestone in the field of disarmament. Indeed, it is the first global, multilateral disarmament agreement which not only bans a whole category of weapons of mass destruction but, with its effective verification regime allowing on-site inspections, also aims to eliminate existing arsenals and prohibit the production of new ones. I take this opportunity to congratulate the members of the Conference on Disarmament on the success of their long-running efforts. In this context, we pay special homage to Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, who, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, played a pivotal role in achieving this outcome.

In the light of recent events in its region, Turkey strongly supports the chemical-weapons Convention and is preparing to be among the original signatories. We call on all States Members of the United Nations to sign and ratify this important document, which we are convinced will make a substantial contribution to peace and security. Turkey welcomes the establishment of the

(Mr. Akgin, Turkey)

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. We intend to make an active contribution to the important work with which that organization will be entrusted.

The successful conclusion of the chemical-weapons Convention should give new impetus to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This is an opportunity to pause for reflection on some important aspects of the Conference's work. We consider that this is the right time for that body to re-examine its composition, agenda and methods of work. We are gratified that the current President of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Servais of Belgium, is carrying out consultations on these important issues.

It is our strongly held view that the Conference on Disarmament should recognize the profound changes that have taken place in world politics and the necessity to adjust its priorities to these changes, which would mean restructuring and redesigning its agenda. It should aim to devise a sharper focus on its more pragmatic objectives in order to address issues of immediate security concern to all States. In the course of this process, the composition of the Conference also merits deep reflection. The radical and far-reaching developments taking place in the world compel us to look for much wider participation and burden-sharing in the Conference so as to reach the objective of working out comprehensive disarmament programmes with more universal participation. Defending the status quo in that body will not be a satisfactory response. Instead of limiting the number of participants in the negotiation process in the name of efficiency and effectiveness, we have to devise ways to open up the Conference on Disarmament to all members of the

(Mr. Aksin, Turkey)

international community that are prepared to contribute to its important work. Universal adherence will best be achieved within the framework of open-ended bodies.

With respect to the programme of work for 1993, priority should be given to nuclear non-proliferation, with due emphasis on reinforcement of international norms, comprehensive nuclear test bans and transparency in armaments. At a time when the risk of the uncontrolled spread of nuclear arms and technology is on the rise, preventive measures that effectively deter and when necessary penalize that spread require our urgent attention.

On transparency in armaments, we believe that the work of the ad hoc committee that we hope will be established in the very near future will be facilitated by drawing on the definitions carefully elaborated in the CFE Treaty and the two Vienna Documents on security-building measures.

(Mr. Aksin, Turkey)

While we appreciate the need for some conceptual work, this should not distract us from taking a pragmatic approach which would enable the Conference to address effectively and urgently the core issues. Priority, in our view, should be given to the elaboration of concrete arrangements which would permit the international community to better monitor international arms transfers and thus achieve a greater degree of transparency.

On the future of the Conference on Disarmament, we support the suggestion made by the Australian delegation that during this session of the Committee a meeting of interested States Members of the United Nations be convened by the President of the Conference to undertake a wide-ranging exchange of views on the composition, agenda and working methods of the Conference. That would be an excellent starting-point.

Turkey has traditionally supported the concept of transparency in military matters, which it considers an important component of efforts aimed at building confidence and reducing unpredictability at a regional as well as universal level. We supported from the very outset the establishment of a standardized United Nations annual reporting system on military budgets and participated in its implementation. In the same vein, Turkey has supported the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and looks forward to its effective implementation in 1993. We welcome the report submitted by the Panel of Governmental Experts and commend the efforts which brought about a consensus among a wide geographic range of countries. The Panel has prepared a standardized format to be used by States for submission of required data, agreed on definitions for the categories of equipment and, most importantly, discussed the modalities for an early expansion of the Register. Turkey holds the view that only by a widening of its scope to

(Mr. Akgin, Turkey)

include procurement from national production can the Register be transformed into an effective and truly non-discriminatory instrument which the relevant resolution has prescribed.

The political developments of the last two years have amply demonstrated the importance of regional arms control and disarmament efforts to buttress the global quest to enhance stability and security.

Although arms control and other security-building endeavours have been largely limited so far to those in Europe, there is a pressing need to broaden the scope of these efforts to embrace other regions of the world.

In this context, the Middle East is of particular importance for my country.

In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, international attention has focused on halting the proliferation of all kinds of weapons in the Middle East while recognizing the legitimate need of every State to defend itself.

The search for a new security structure and measures in the Middle East with a view to promoting peace in the region should aim at establishing stability and security at the lowest possible level of military forces. The divergent interests and different priorities of the regional Powers and the complexities of the political landscape of the region make an arms control process a difficult undertaking. But the prospects for achieving it now are better than ever. We view the Middle East peace conference as an historic opportunity for finding a lasting solution to the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Within the framework of the multilateral dimension of the conference and as a complement to the bilateral negotiations, a working group has been formed to address arms control and regional security matters. Turkey

(Mr. Aksin, Turkey)

participates in the work of this group and has expressed its readiness to share its experience with the regional countries in the strong belief that progress on arms control and confidence-building will make a substantial contribution to the success of the peace process as a whole. Drawing on the successful results of the European enterprise on arms control and security building, Turkey envisages a security structure for the Middle East that is capable of adjustment to regional realities. It could be designed as a system that moves in stages while it deepens and progressively becomes more binding as its rewards in terms of increased security become widely shared. This, we hope, will provide a greater political incentive to take on the challenges of the following stages of cooperation and integration.

We recognize the impediments in this process, but we are confident that they are not insuperable.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that we support the efforts towards the rationalization of the work of the First Committee with a view to achieving more effective results on the basis of a leaner, more flexible and streamlined agenda. Turkey stands ready to contribute in a constructive spirit to these efforts and to the proceedings of the Committee.

Mr. RIVERO ROSARIO (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the delegation of Cuba permit me to congratulate Mr. Nabil Elaraby on his election as Chairman of the First Committee this year. We have had an opportunity to work with him on many occasions in this Committee and in other bodies, and are therefore confident that our work will lead to a productive and successful conclusion.

(Mr. Rivero Rosario, Cuba)

We also congratulate the other officers of the Committee who we are sure will contribute to the smooth functioning of our work. The Cuban delegation welcomes the delegations of the new States that have recently become Members of the Organization.

There is no doubt that a number of events have occurred recently in the process of disarmament and arms control which have had a positive impact on the climate in which the work of this Committee is conducted and, consequently, on the kind of decisions that will be taken.

Our responsibility in how we deal with the important items on our agenda requires that we objectively analyse them and think in a balanced and impartial way, avoiding undue optimism or a sense of triumph to influence our deliberations.

Let us put in practice that transparency which is so much in vogue in all our dealings. Let us recognize that much progress has been made but that we are far from having reached our final goal - general and complete disarmament.

In the area of nuclear disarmament, significant steps have been taken as a result of agreements and initiatives between the United States and the Russian Federation which, when added to the commitments already entered into in the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) and the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty), contribute to reducing the number of nuclear weapons and to their elimination, as called for by the international community.

The commitments by the States of the former Soviet Union that possess nuclear weapons to move towards their elimination is also a positive step.

(Mr. Rivero Rosario, Cuba)

Although the threat of a world conflagration is now more remote, the nuclear weapons remaining in the arsenals of those States that possess these diabolical weapons of mass destruction are more than enough to destroy our planet many times over and therefore continue to pose a threat to mankind.

(Mr. Rivero Rosario, Cuba)

In my delegation's opinion, there is today no argument of any kind to justify - as nuclear Powers would like to do - the existence of nuclear weapons and the policies of nuclear deterrence. These policies emanated from the cold war, but the cold war is ended, and elementary logic suggests that those who still have nuclear weapons and continue to perfect them must stop trying to make us victims of a policy that belongs to the past.

Even if, last year, there was no immediate agreement on a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, the moratoriums decided on by two nuclear Powers and the position assumed by some of the others suggest that we should take advantage of the fact that those countries have expressed the political will that, along with the efforts a group of countries have been exerting for a few years now, should make it possible to move towards achieving the objective of the total and complete prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that next year the Conference on Disarmament should not encounter any obstacle to the establishment of a subsidiary body with the negotiation mandate required to deal with this subject.

In the context of the nuclear items - which my country continues to feel should have top priority - there is the question of safeguards against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against States that do not possess them. Even now there is a lack of such safeguards for those countries that did not have them during the cold war.

In 1995 there will be a Conference that will have to take a stand on the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This Committee will take a decision on the preparatory process in respect of that

(Mr. Rivero Rosario, Cuba)

Conference. As is known, Cuba is not a party to the non-proliferation Treaty. Although we agree with the general objective - that it is necessary to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons - we believe that, through that instrument, discrimination is exercised with regard to the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States and the obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, the non-proliferation Treaty does not provide guarantees concerning proper and full access for all States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

It is my delegation's opinion that if we are to achieve the universality that all international instruments should enjoy we must take advantage of the present situation to ensure that, within the framework of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference itself, there will be a broad exchange of opinions in which States that are parties to the Treaty and States that are not parties will participate. The objective is to prevent proliferation and, either through reformulating certain parts of the Treaty or through including an additional protocol, we must establish a fair balance of rights and obligations, which must be equal for all States. Cuba declares its willingness to take part in that exchange. Without abandoning our interest in the adoption of a resolution that has the full support of all delegations, we hope that the draft resolution with which we are presented will contain a reference to the idea I have just mentioned.

No representative in this Committee is unaware of how important it is for the international community and the cause of peace and disarmament that, after many years of negotiation, agreement has been reached on a draft convention

(Mr. Rivero Rosario, Cuba)

that not only bans weapons of mass destruction of a certain type - I refer to chemical weapons - but also makes provision for the destruction of such weapons and of the facilities for producing them and for the establishment of a delicate mechanism to ensure that the weapons will not be diverted from the peaceful uses so necessary for economic and social development.

Cuba does not possess chemical weapons. It has come out in favour of banning and totally eliminating all weapons of mass destruction, and it is opposed to the use of chemical weapons. For Cuba, agreement on a convention to ban the chemical weapons that are already in the arsenals of some States and to provide for verified destruction, without creating any discrimination between States as to rights and obligations and without presenting obstacles to the proper and necessary development of the chemicals industry, is a matter of major significance. Mr. von Wagner has undoubtedly done outstanding work in this respect, for which he deserves our praise.

In our opinion the text that has been submitted to the General Assembly by the Conference on Disarmament could have been made more comprehensive. My delegation expressed its opinions to that effect in the negotiating body. Nevertheless, our general evaluation is that the text is acceptable.

The delegation of Cuba has joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1 and is prepared to take an active part in the Preparatory Committee's consultations and negotiations concerning the future regime for the banning of chemical weapons.

The exercise that the Conference on Disarmament carried out in connection with the item on chemical weapons confirms clearly and undeniably that when States possess the necessary political will or there is no objective, no matter how remote it may appear, that cannot be achieved. This fact leads us

(Mr. Rivero Rosario, Cuba)

to the conlusion that, because of its multilateral nature, the Conference on Disarmament is the body that can and should conduct negotiations on disarmament matters, such as nuclear issues, which have implications for all our countries. In saying that, however, we do not mean to take any importance away from bilateral agreements reached by the nuclear Powers.

My delegation is prepared to participate in the exchanges of opinion with regard to the negotiating body's agenda and programme of work and to consider whether items that have not yet been placed on the agenda could be dealt with in that forum. But any analysis that is carried out must take account of the importance, indeed the priority, of nuclear issues. These issues continue to command the attention and concern of the international community, and although they have been on the agenda for many years the efforts in respect of them have not yet been crowned with success.

There is also the question of the membership of the negotiating body. Here we must take into account the fact that several countries are interested in becoming members and also that changes have taken place in the international arena. One military alliance has ceased to exist, and changes in political postures have resulted in ongoing accommodation of positions and realignments.

The Secretary-General has presented us with a report on the study by the panel of governmental technical experts on the question of transparency in armaments and the Register of Conventional Arms, which was created last year under resolution 46/36 L. We thank the experts who carried out this study. Under the leadership of the Ambassador of the Netherlands, they reached full

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agreement on all the matters before them. This document contains numerous recommendations and puts forward many considerations.

We take note of the study and of the recommendations that appear in the report, and would make the point that we are beginning to see evolution in the Register in that it is being expanded. That evolution should be made even broader, through the deliberations and activities of the new group of experts and through the work being done along these lines by the Conference on Disarmament.

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In this connection we would like to point out that in our opinion the list of topics which could be discussed relating to the future expansion of the Register and which appear in the report are suggestions and the list is not final, as there are after all certain questions which should still be considered; to give just a few examples, we might mention national production, the transfer of technology and the question of the transfer of weapons of mass destruction.

We have all witnessed that progress has been made in the adoption of agreements on disarmament and arms control, just as we have also witnessed the increasingly difficult economic situation of the so-called developing countries. So there is an even greater need for the action programme adopted by consensus at the United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development to acquire a practical dimension, one that will help us to solve the difficult fundamental economic and social problems being faced so dramatically by the developing countries.

If as the international community has said it is a primary goal of the Organization to guarantee international peace and security, then we must face reality squarely and bear in mind that peace and security have as enemies not just aggression and war but also poverty, disease, malnutrition, unemployment and other scourges.

Everyone recognizes the close link between disarmament and international security and how both interact. In order to achieve the goal of peace and at the same time move towards disarmament and the strengthening of peace and international security, it is absolutely necessary fully to respect the purposes and principles of international law and the United Nations Charter. In particular we must respect the principle of non-aggression, the

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non-use or threat of use of force, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In spite of the end of the military and political confrontation between East and West and the end of the so-called cold war, there continue to exist certain policies and forms of conduct against developing countries that run counter to the peace to which our peoples aspire.

Our country is an example of this. Not only is part of our national territory being usurped as a result of the presence of a military base of the United States against the will of our people and Government but, in addition, we continue to be the victim of a criminal economic and financial blockade that has existed for three decades and at present is becoming even stronger owing to the so-called Torricelli law which, among other things, violates the sovereignty of third States by claiming to invest its Draconian measures with an extraterritorial character.

Also, there continue to be attempts at armed infiltration by terrorist organizations based on United States territory which quite unabashedly admit to their destabilizing purposes, while they keep braodcasting subversive propaganda via radio and television in violation of our radio-space.

It is clear that these activities in no way contribute to promoting confidence or to creating a climate of international peace and security.

Mr. AUNG (Myanmar): I should like to begin by extending to Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt the warmest congratulations of the Myanmar delegation on his election as Chairman of the First Committee. His vast experience in disarmament affairs and his diplomatic skills assure us of a

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fruitful session. Myanmar and Egypt have a long history of cooperation in the Conference on Disarmament and in other international forums. May I assure him that it will be the constant endeavour of my delegation to maintain that tradition.

I wish also to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their well-deserved election and assure them of our full support and cooperation in the discharge of their important duties.

Allow me to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to Mr. Robert Mroziewicz, Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland for the skilful manner in which he guided the work of the Committee last year.

It is with sadness that my delegation learned of the news of the devastating earthquake which struck Cairo recently resulting in the loss of many lives and causing extensive damage to property. I ask Ambassador Elaraby to accept our heartfelt condolences.

We live in a world of rapid transformation. Since the Committee's last session many changes have taken place and our world today differs markedly from that which existed even a few years ago. Time was when disarmament negotiations were conducted under the ominous clouds of the cold war. Today our endeavours in the field of disarmament are taking place in a dramatically altered situation. With the abandonment of the ideological posturing of the cold-war decades, the world political climate has brightened considerably. Throughout the past year the end of the cold war continued to have a positive impact on international security and disarmament. There have been encouraging signs that the unbridled nuclear-arms race between the principal nuclear

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Powers has finally been reined in. One welcome sign is the June 1992 agreement between the United States and Russia to reduce significantly their nuclear arsenals. Another is the decline in the number of tests as a result of the unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing declared by France, Russia and the United States. Progress on negotiations on a Convention on chemical weapons too has been dramatic. Who could have predicted that in the final stage of the long and complex negotiations on a Convention on chemical weapons the Conference on Disarmament so much could have been achieved in so short a time and that we would have the Convention for consideration by the Committee at this session.

The positive trends of the past year in the field of international security and disarmament were facilitated by the changed international environment brought about by the end of the cold war. The demise of the cold war has made it possible for nuclear disarmament to move forward. My delegation feels that this is the time to make conscious efforts to consolidate those gains and to ensure that the future world order will be peaceful and secure.

Nuclear-weapon States, particularly the principal ones, have a special responsibility to undertake further steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. In the light of the political and military transformations taking place in Europe and indeed in the world, a review of their military-technological thinking is a logical step that should be pursued. The end of rivalry and confrontation between the two power blocs makes completely senseless the huge arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction that they have accumulated over the years. Following the Second World War the growth in the nuclear weapons

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of one super-Power was justified by the perceived threat of the expansionism of the other. Each side sought to hold the other in check with the threat of nuclear retaliation, and nuclear deterrence was thereby born. However, now that the Soviet Union has been dissolved and no longer represents the challenge it was perceived to be, doctrines that dominated military thought and planning throughout the cold-war years have lost their meaning. Appropriate security structures without nuclear weapons must be found to replace those outdated doctrines. The cold war is behind us. It is time to build common security by first ridding our world of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

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On many occasions Myanmar has emphasized that for peace and security to prevail the principles of the United Nations Charter and generally recognized norms of inter-State relations must at all times be scrupulously observed. We fully share the view stated in the Chairman's opening address that the responsibility for addressing the new problems lies with each country and that

> "The starting-point for facing up to the current challenges - both in the area of moving forward on disarmament or in the area of maintaining international peace and security, is recognition by all States of the commonality of interest and the equality of rights and duties. That would make it possible to formulate and lay the foundations of the norms and principles that should govern international relations now and in the future." (A/C.1/47/PV.3, p. 3)

We also support his view that the principles of the Charter are a solid foundation on which to base the development of a new world order, an order in which peace, justice, equality, freedom and prosperity prevail.

The Myanmar delegation also shares the Secretary-General's view that all organs of the United Nations should play their appropriate roles and that under the Charter of the General Assembly, like the Security Council and the Secretary-General, has an important role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security.

What was said by the Chairman of the Myanmar delegation, Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Ohn Gyaw, in his statement to the General Assembly earlier this month, bears reiterating here. He said:

> "To be truly effective the United Nations must by its own actions inspire and command the confidence of all Member countries. Its actions must be governed by a sense of justice and guided by the principles of the Charter. The decisions of the Organisation must reflect that

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collective will and not the narrow interests or predilections of a nation or a group of nations. Any departure from those principles is bound to be divisive and to detract from our efforts to construct a fair and equitable international order. The time is ripe to examine whether the constitutional balance between the principal bodies of the Organization, particularly between the General Assembly and the Security Council, is being consistently maintained as envisaged in the Charter." (A/47/PV.24, p. 71)

We believe that, in the spirit of Article 24, the General Assembly cannot be marginalized.

Turning to the disarmament items before the Committee, the Myanmar delegation joins other delegations in welcoming the successful conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons Convention in the Conference on Disarmament. We have before us for consideration the long-awaited draft Convention for the total elimination of one category of weapons of mass destruction. A significant number of States, including my own, have sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1, which will pave the way for the signing of the Convention in Paris in January 1993.

The draft Convention is a consensus document that has been painstakingly put together. As such, it understandably does not reflect faithfully the preferred position of each and every party to the negotiations. Myanmar, however, is firmly convinced that the text before us represents the best compromise; that the Convention will enhance, rather than diminish, the security of all States parties; and that to postpone the adoption of the Convention would only rob us of the opportunity to rid the world of the massive accumulation of horrendous weapons of mass destruction stockpiled in

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many parts of the globe. As my Foreign Minister declared in his statement to the General Assembly:

> "As a country that neither possesses nor manufactures those weapons of mass destruction, nor has any intention of acquiring them in the future, we welcome the convention and intend to become an original signatory." (A/47/PV.24, p. 74-75)

The conclusion of the draft chemical-weapons Convention is incontestable proof that a whole category of weapons of mass destruction can effectively be outlawed if States that possess them and States that seek to obtain them have the political will to accept a universal and equitable treaty.

In our view, the Conference on Disarmament should next focus its attention on nuclear disarmament, particularly on achieving the long-sought comprehensive test-ban treaty. Nuclear-testing moratoriums declared by France, Russia and the United States are important steps, and we hope that the present impasse in the Conference on Disarmament over the issue of a negotiating mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban can be overcome before the Conference resumes its work in 1993.

We note with satisfaction the announcement by President Yeltsin three days ago that Russia will extend its unilateral moratorium until July 1993. We hope others will follow that good example, paving the way for a global regime banning nuclear tests in all environments for all time. The justifications given for the continuation of nuclear testing have never been persuasive, and are today less convincing than ever. My delegation continues to believe firmly that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is an indispensable step towards a saner world - a world without nuclear weapons.

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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a fundamental instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Recent accession to that Treaty by a number of States, including the People's Republic of China and France, further enhances the Treaty's effectiveness. That all five permanent members of the Security Council are now States parties to the non-proliferation regime augurs well for the 1995 NPT review conference.

The progress in the field of nuclear disarmament - implementation of the INF Treaty, the signing of the START Treaty and the agreement by the principal nuclear Powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals - is reassuring. Since 1965, when Myanmar joined other States in proposing the NPT, we have sought an acceptable balance of mutual obligations between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Now that the principal nuclear-weapon States are demonstrating their resolve to discharge their obligations under Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, the Myanmar Government has decided to accede to the Treaty as stated by my Foreign Minister in his statement to the General Assembly on 5 October 1992.

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The risk of proliferation - both horizontal and vertical - remains a serious concern of the international community. We hope that nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States will work together to buttress the present regime by strengthening the incentive for universal adherence by Member States to the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty, scheduled for 1995, should offer us a good opportunity to do so.

Recent transformations in the international political climate and the dissolution of military blocs should make it possible for the international community to make some progress in finding means to develop effective arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The ultimate assurance would be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. However, pending that effective measure, the non-nuclear-weapon States must be given credible assurances, through legally binding guarantees, by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Such a step would promote global security. We welcome the agreement in the Conference on Disarmament to reestablish the Ad Hoc Committee on this important question at the beginning of the 1993 session.

Bilateral and multilateral approaches to disarmament complement each other and should be pursued simultaneously with a view to promoting our common goal.

The priority we rightly place on nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction cannot, and should not, deflect our attention from the growing threat posed to international peace and security by conventional weapons. Since the Second World War there has been an almost unbroken

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chain of international armed conflicts fought with conventional weapons, resulting in untold suffering and destruction. Some of these conflicts and crises even brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster. The Gulf War clearly demonstrates the awesome destructive power of present-day conventional weapons, particularly those that use sophisticated technologies, and shows the magnitude of the human suffering resulting from their use. The international community must give serious attention to the threat posed to the world by the excessive and destabilizing build-up of those weapons, the perpetuation of conflicts and threats and acts of intervention by some States.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms has now been established with a view to promoting transparency in armaments. The success or failure of this new venture will depend on the universal cooperation of Member States. This will require that it be fair and non-discriminatory. The subject of arms transfers is a broad one. The situation is complex, and a variety of factors, domestic and international, need to be taken into account. We believe that real reduction in military outlays and weapons procurement can be achieved with the easing of local tensions and the peaceful settlement of disputes. To that end, nations need to be left to themselves to resolve their domestic or bilateral problems, free from external interference.

Every nation has the sovereign right to determine its own defence needs. The vast majority of States lack indigenous defence industries and are dependent on imports to meet their legitimate self-defence needs. For some of those small and medium-sized States their predicament is sometimes compounded by threats to their security by terrorist groups whose intent is inimical to

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the national interest and whose acquisition of illegal arms goes unchecked. It is of paramount importance therefore to address the issue of arms transfers in a balanced and comprehensive manner, taking fully into account the legitimate security needs of Member States.

The positive trends in the field of disarmament are significant and provide the much-needed impetus to the disarmament negotiations and a fresh sense of purpose. With the rationalization of the work being undertaken in this Committee, my delegation is confident that our deliberations will be crowned with success.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall convey to Mr. Elaraby the words of condolence expressed by the representative of Myanmar with respect to the recent disaster in Egypt.

Before adjourning, I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform the Committee that the Niger has become one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1, entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons".

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.